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9 Conclusion
Geoffrey Garrett, Frank Dobbin, and Beth Simmons
The concurrent rise of liberal politics and free market economics around
the world was a defining feature of the latter part of the twentieth
century. The social sciences were not well positioned to explain this
global phenomenon. Models of policymaking and political change had
privileged domestic factors for at least half a century. From Lipset’s view
of democracy as the product of economic modernization within countries
to Shonfield’s division of the world into divergent national capitalisms,
the underlying meta-model of political and policy change was one of
unconnected domestic processes.
1
As democracy and markets swept to the four corners of the globe, the
limitations of purely domestic models became increasingly apparent.
Countries democratized that Lipset would have considered too poor to
do so. Chile and the United Kingdom, countries that Shonfield would
surely never have associated as kindred capitalist spirits, led the world in
privatization and deregulation. Phenomena such as these led pundits to
propose common exogenous forces as the driver of global political and
economic change. Globalization, fueled by technological innovations
lowering costs to international exchange of goods, services, capital, and
information, was seen as forcing governments to embrace the market and
as undermining economically inefficient authoritarian regimes – leading
to ‘‘the end of history,’’ in Fukuyama’s famous formulation.
2
But the grandiose claims about the ubiquity of liberalism soon came to
be challenged by events, notably anti-globalization protests and anti-
modernity terrorist attacks. At the same time, social scientists have also
moved toward a middle ground in terms of the balance between forces of
change that are internal and external to countries. The ‘‘common stim-
ulus, mediated response’’ model has been used to reconcile the broad
trend toward liberal markets with substantial national variations in the
speed and the end points of change. Big global forces, such as the faster,
1 Lipset 1959 Shonfield 1965.
2 Fukuyama 1989.
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freer, and cheaper movement of capital and goods, and information and
ideas, are seen to create pressures for liberalization. But these pressures
are channeled, modified, and sometimes blocked by conditions within
countries such as government partisanship, public opinion, and socio-
economic structures.
3
The point of departure of this volume is our conviction that even the
best expositions of the common stimulus, mediated response model still
fail to capture important causal processes in the recent trend towards
democracy and markets, as well as deviations from this trend. Broad
common stimuli like globalization certainly do matter; so too do the
domestic conditions that mediate their impact in different countries.
But irrespective of how sophisticated in conception or well executed in
practice, this model is inherently incapable of coming to grips with the
interdependent decision making among countries that we consider to
have been a central element in the spread of liberalization in recent
decades.
The challenge the authors in this volume have faced has been to bring
rigor both theoretically and empirically to the notion that markets and
democracy have ‘‘diffused’’among countriesas aproduct ofinterdepend-
ent decision making, as well as to delineate the precise causal pathways
through which this has happened.
With respect to theory, we have outlined four basic mechanisms of
interdependent decision making: coercion, competition, learning, and
emulation. These have then been tested empirically against different
facets of liberalization – democratization, increasing the rights of
women, cutting taxation, public sector downsizing, privatization, bilat-
eral investment protections, and capital account liberalization – using
cutting-edge statistical techniques analyzing data for large numbers of
countries over several decades. Each chapter has been disciplined by the
same protocolsofinquirybyfirsttakinginto accountallthenon-diffusion
causal processes that might plausibly have shaped the policy under analy-
sis; and then by comparing the explanatory power of the different diffu-
sion mechanisms political scientists, sociologists, and economists have
proposed.
In this conclusion, we beginby assessing what wehavelearnedfrom the
empirical chapters about the likely drivers of the diffusion of liberal
policies. There is ample evidence that each of the mechanisms has played
somepartinthetrendtoliberalism(anditslimits).Ratherthanprivileging
any one of the contending meta-approaches to the world underpinning
3 Keohane and Milner 1996.
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our mechanisms – realism for coercion, materialism for competition,
rationalism for learning, or constructivism for emulation – most of the
studiesinthisvolumeunderscorethegreatutilityofincorporatinginsights
from all these diverse analytic frameworks into models of interdependent
policymaking.
We then move on to a broader discussion that places the recent wave of
liberalisminhistoricalcontext(bothbackwardlookingandforwardlooking).
We also make some judgments about the likely power of diffusion processes
outside the time period and policy areas on which this book has focused.
We do not have a naively teleological view of liberalism. The trends we
have witnessed towards democracy and markets in recent decades have
slowed down and there have been significant backlashes against them.
We cannot rule out the possibility that the world may significantly reverse
course against liberalism. However, as the world get ‘‘smaller’’ with the
shrinking of time and distance in all aspects of human endeavor, we
believe that diffusion processes will likely become even more important
than they have been in the recent past with respect to the spread of
markets and democracy – and that the utility for social scientists of
analyzing countries as interdependent rather than independent actors
will only increase.
Four diffusion mechanisms
The chapters in this volume subject the four approaches to diffusion to
close empirical scrutiny, and with explicit controls for the common
stimulus, mediated response null hypothesis. We are thus confident in
the results of these studies. They generate two principal findings. On the
one hand, neither coercion nor learning has been particularly important
to the spread of political and economic liberalism. Notwithstanding the
appeal of traditional realist perspectives as well as Marxian notions of
dependency, the studies in this volume do not adduce much support for
the coercion hypothesis. The informational and inferential requirements
are just too high for rational learning to play out in practice the way it is
conceived in economics textbooks.
On the other hand, our chapters generate strong support for both
competition and emulation. Countries that compete with each other for
investment from footloose global capital must take seriously the policies
oftheir competitor nations inthose cases whereinvestors candraw strong
and direct connections between government policies and their rates of
return – taxation, investor protections, and capital account policy. At the
same time, the cause and effect of policies is not always so clear, even in
cases such as public sector downsizing and privatization where
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economists have united behind the ‘‘more markets’’ position. In these
cases, however, epistemic communities such as those among the frater-
nity of professional economists can have a marked impact on what gov-
ernments do, by influencing what they consider the right thing to do in a
world clouded by uncertainty. Thus, the logic of appropriateness high-
lighted by sociologists and constructivists with respect to ‘‘soft’’ issues
such as human rightstreaties are just as apparent insomeissues of‘‘hard’’
economics as well.
Coercion
Powerful countries have sometimes imposed political and economic lib-
eralism on their vanquished foes. The United States’ rebuilding of
Germany and Japan largely in its own image after the Second World
War is widely considered the paradigmatic – and essentially benign –
example of such coercion. In the contemporary era, the US has often
explicitly referred to these examples in its efforts to build democracy and
markets in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Since Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Marxian
scholars have argued that inter-state coercion is likely to take subtle
forms in an interconnected world where economic power is at least as
important as military might. According to this view, rich countries exert
their will over poor countries through the use of economic carrots and
sticks. Much attention has been focused on the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) in recent years, in particular the attaching of specific con-
ditions about economic policy (the ‘‘Washington consensus’’ around
liberalization, stabilization, privatization, and deregulation) to bailout
packages for developing countries facing financial crises.
One can also argue, however, that the European Union practices a very
soft form of coercion – and unlike IMF conditionality, one that tends to
be lauded even in countries subject to it. Countries that wish to join the
EU must first convince the existing members that they have stably demo-
cratic political systems and also must accept the EU’s acquis communitaire
of economic regulations as well as the right of the European Court of
Justice to rule in economic disputes among member states.
Turning to the chapters in this volume, it should not be surprising that
neither Gleditsch and Ward nor Wotipka and Ramirez adduced evidence
of north–south coercion through IMF conditionality in the diffusion of
democracy and human rights respectively. As they point out, though the
IMF is probably supportive of liberal politics in a normative sense, it has
shied away from attaching conditions regarding political reforms to its
loan packages.
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One would expect things to be different in the realm of economic
policy. While IMF effects were moot in the Swank and Lee and Strang
chapters that focused solely on Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries, Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons
and Kogut and Macpherson found evidence that countries subject to
IMF loan programs were more likely to sign bilateral investment treaties
and to privatize state-owned enterprises respectively. Given the emphasis
the IMF attaches to the building of private capital markets as an essential
element of creating robust market economies in developing countries,
these effects should have been expected.
Inbothcases,however,theauthorssuggestthatIMFlinkagesmightnot
actuallybeevidenceofcoercioninthestrictsense.KogutandMacpherson
contend that there is at least some volition involved in countries’ being
under IMF programs, and that the resulting good housekeeping seal of
approval has a positive impact on the value of privatized assets – creating
incentives for countries to privatize. Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons sug-
gest that the correlation between IMF obligations and Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) may be more coincidental than causal.
Countries that are willing to undertake IMF obligations are also more
likely to be interested in investment treaties with developed economies,
andtheremaybeefficienciesinvolvedinundertakingbothsimultaneously.
Quinn and Toyoda did not find any link between IMF lending and capital
account liberalization. But the authors are quick to point out that the IMF
has never formally embraced capital account liberalization as a necessary
policy reform for developing countries, and indeed has backed off even
further since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Instead, the IMF
tendstoviewthedevelopmentofstrongprivatecapitalmarketsasanecessary
precondition for capital account liberalization. But Quinn and Toyoda dem-
onstrate a strong connection between accession to the European Union and
the opening of capital accounts – since the EU in the late 1980s made capital
account openness mandatory among existing and aspiring members.
Movingfromthe kinds ofcoercion associated withinternational organ-
izations, some might have expected also to see that the US ‘‘imposed’’ its
policy preferences, or at least became a crucial focal point for coordina-
tion on, lower taxes and public sector downsizing among other OECD
countries. But both Swank and Lee and Strang argue thatthis was not the
case, focusing instead on competition and emulation as forces for policy
diffusion in the economic policies of OECD countries.
Gleditsch and Ward do, however, make a compelling argument about
the role of regional power resources in the development of democracy.
They observe significant regional clustering of transitions to democracy,
not only in the postwar period but since the third quarter of the
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nineteenthcentury. Thiseffectshows upinthe quantitativeanalyseseven
when domestic factors are controlled. Gleditsch and Ward’s interpreta-
tion of this clustering is that backers of democracy need support from
neighboring countries to effect change. Regional powers can thus retard
democratization (as with the USSR in East Germany in the years before
1989) or the move to democracy (Brazil’s role in Paraguay in the late
1980s). Their case studies provide suggestive evidence of the importance
of regional power resources.
In sum, the evidence for the role of coercion in the diffusion of liber-
alism around the world in recent decades is at best mixed. Gleditsch and
Ward make the novel argument that regional power resources play an
important role in democratization. Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons and
Kogut and Macpherson were able to isolate effects of IMF lending, but
they were reticent to label these effects ‘‘conditionality’’ in the conven-
tional sense. In marked contrast with the foreign policy of the G.W. Bush
administration to try to generate markets and democracy in the Middle
East via ‘‘the barrel of a gun,’’ the studies in this volume suggest that the
ability of the rich and powerful to impose their policies on the poor and
the weak was not likely to be the primary engine of the diffusion of liberal
policies in the past half century.
Competition
The hypothesis of diffusion by competition rests on the notion that
countries liberalize to compete with each other for international market
share andglobalinvestment. In the areas oftaxation (Swank), investment
protection treaties (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons) and capital account
openness (Quinn and Toyoda), our authors found clear evidence of this
diffusion by economic competition mechanism.
Swank shows that after the US tax reform in 1986, other OECD
countries moved in the direction of the new American model of ‘‘market-
conforming’’ corporate taxation – in which the marginal rate of tax-
ation on corporations was reduced while the tax base was broadened and
loopholes were eliminated. He argues that countries followed the US lead
for a very pragmatic reason: to attract investors with freedom to choose
where and when to invest and interested in the higher rates of return that
lower marginal corporate tax rates delivered. Swank’s argument is similar
to the argument about ‘‘go-it-alone’’ power originally developed by
Gruber.
4 The OECD countries may not have wanted to change their
4 Gruber 2001.
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corporate tax systems, and they did not have to – so long as the US did not
act. But once the US enacted their reforms, other countries had little
choice but to follow suit.
Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons argue that when it comes to invest-
ment liberalization, countries signing bilateral investment treaties do
not ‘‘follow the leader’’ but rather follow their economic competitors.
They demonstrate that countries are more likely to sign BITs if others
with similar trade partners have done so, because countries with sim-
ilar trade partners tend to compete both in export markets and for
foreign investment in similar sectors. But the underlying logic of com-
petition is the same. BITs diffuse because of global competition among
countries for mobile capital. Quinn and Toyoda find a similar game of
follow-your-peers with respect to capital account liberalization, parti-
cularly among OECD countries. OECD countries do follow the lead
taken by their major capital competitor, even if developing countries
do not.
Corporate taxes, investment protection treaties, and capital account
openness all have a direct impact on the bottom line of global firms and
investors.Capitalistsknowwhattheylike,andtheycandirectlyinferlinks
between government policy and their rates of return. This is precisely the
environment in which we would expect – and the studies in this volume
find – diffusion by competition to be most powerful.
It might be tempting to think that this competitive dynamic would
extend to all facets of economic policy in the contemporary global econ-
omy. But this is not the case, because the connection between policy and
outcomes is not always direct or clear. This is the argument Lee and
Strang and Kogut and Macpherson make in their studies of public sector
downsizing and privatization. Notwithstanding the messianic ‘‘more
market’’ rhetoric of some pundits, there is actually not much evidence
that government downsizing and privatization increase rates of return in
national economies. Hence it is not at all clear that governments need to
engage in a competitive race to the bottom in these policy areas.
Ex ante, we had little reason to expect competition to be a powerful
diffusion mechanism with respect to liberal political reforms, and this is
borne out in the two studies of this phenomenon. The studies on
democracy (Gleditsch and Ward) and on women’s rights (Wotipka
and Ramirez) find no evidence that political liberalization has spread
by means of competition. One might have expected countries to compete
for trade and foreign capital investment via political liberalization,
if traders and investors had a strong preference for democracies over
dictatorships. But for many years democracy and the promotion of
human rights in developing nations was thought to put foreign capital
350 Geoffrey Garrett, Frank Dobbin, and Beth Simmons//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/GDM/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521878890C09.3D 351 [344–360] 8.9.2007 6:56AM
at risk of various forms of expropriation and instability more generally.
As a result, many believe that authoritarianism (and certainly its more
benevolent strands) may be better for the economy at early stages of
development.
Taken together these studies suggest that competition does stimulate
countries to adopt policies that promise directly to influence rates of
return and hence the investment and location decisions of mobile capital,
notably policies governing capital taxes, investment, and capital
accounts. Policies that might influence investment only indirectly and
with uncertain effects – downsizing and privatization – were not notice-
ably shaped by competition. Democratization has been associated with
the rise of free market competition, but investors have not routinely
favored it.
As a result, political liberalization cannot readily be explained by the
same competitive mechanisms that likely underlie policies to attract
investment capital and increase product market share. This finding may
help explain why economic liberalization does not lead in a lock-step
fashion to political liberalization. A crucial bottom-line incentive – the
policy moves of competitors – does not have the same power to pry open
the doors of political liberalization as is the case with market-friendly
innovations.
Learning
The notion of diffusion by learning has not been tested rigorously in
previous studies. Proponents have often been content to demonstrate
that some countries follow the lead of others, but there are plausible
reasons for this (for example competition and emulation) that do not
entail any learning from experiences, either direct or vicarious. In con-
trast,thechaptersinthisvolumetakeamorestringentapproachtotesting
for learning by examining whether the spread of a liberal policy to a new
country was based on revealed evidence that it had the desired effects in
other comparable nations.
With respect to domestic economic policy liberalization, both Swank
and Kogut and Macpherson rule out learning effects in their policy
domains. In the case of corporate tax reform, Swank shows that countries
adopted the new American approach even though there was evidence that
it did not work and would not work for them – because of overwhelm-
ing competitive pressures to curry favor with the markets. Kogut and
Macphersonfoundthatprivatizationwasnotundertakenasatoolfordeficit
reduction, and that there is little evidence that selling off state-owned assets
has proved a successful strategy for stabilizing the state budget.
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Lee and Strang do offer some evidence of learning with respect to
public sector downsizing, but they do so in the context of a modified
theoretical approach emphasizing the role of global communities of
experts. They demonstrate that positive evidence that downsizing
improved economic performance contributed to future downsizings in
other countries. Interestingly, however, Lee and Strang also show that
negative evidence did not discourage future downsizings. This implies
that evidence-based learning is shaped by current economic thought.
After the idea of government workforce reduction caught on as a liberal
policy prescription, countries internalized positive but not negative evi-
dence of its efficacy. This adds an interesting twist, suggesting that
learning is conditioned on the presence of a theory that links cause
to effect.
The two studies of foreign economic policies come to similar conclu-
sions about the effects of learning on liberalization. Quinn and Toyoda
show that ‘‘successful’’ capital account opening – defined as the growth
record for countries within the region that have already liberalized –
increased the probability that other countries in the region themselves
subsequently liberalized. Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons similarly find
evidence that governments emulate policies that ‘‘work.’’ Using the beta
coefficient for the effect of the number of BITs on capital inflows (con-
trolling for growth), they found governments were more likely to sign
BITs when evidence of their payoffs in terms of investment flows was
strongest. It is likely in this case that the global policymaking environ-
ment, while noisy, allowed policymakers to draw at least tentative con-
clusions from existing natural experiments. One difference between these
two studies, it should be noted, is that Quinn and Toyoda assumed
lessons would be drawn from regional experiments, while Elkins,
Guzman, and Simmons assumed lessons can be drawn from global
experience.
With respect to political liberalization, Gleditsch and Ward demon-
strate that countries are more likely to move toward democracy when
their near neighbors have made the policy work. In the case of Paraguay,
for instance, military leaders learned from their neighbors that the tran-
sition from military dictatorship to democracy need not result in a blood-
bath and need not depose the existing party, and that free elections
brought greater, not lesser, political stability. But in contrast, Wotipka
and Ramirez did not find any evidence of learning in the spread of
women’s rights treaty, largely because they did not explicitly test for it.
In the caseofwomen’s rights, learning models wouldbedifficult to test as
there are no clear predictions about measurable benefits, economic or
otherwise. Where the policy in question is not a ‘‘well established
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technology’’ linked with clearly observable results, learning theory may
not be directly applicable.
Our interpretation of the limited support presented in this volume for
the strictly rational version of diffusion by learning hypothesis is that its
informational and inferential requirements are very high, much higher
than theoretical economists tend to assume – and often too high to sway
the behavior of governments in important policy areas. Consider the case
of privatization. For many years economists considered Thatcher’s initial
privatizations asuccessful natural experiment from which other countries
learned, updated their priors about the efficacy of nationalized versus
privatized industries, and sold off their state-owned enterprises. In fact, it
has proved very hard to demonstrate that privatization ‘‘works,’’ either in
terms of making an individual firm more profitable, or a national econ-
omy more productive. Rational learning is highly compatible with game
theoretic approaches to social change, but this volume suggests that its
utility in explaining national policy change may be limited.
Emulation
Diffusion by emulation suggests that policies and practices spread
through a process of socially-informed mimicry. The ‘‘world polity’’
approach suggests that new policy approaches are constructed as ‘‘appro-
priate’’ at the global level based on the histories and theories of leading
nations.Constructivistsargue thatepistemiccommunities ofexpertsmay
act as missionaries facilitating the transfer of policy ideas among coun-
tries. Most previous research on emulation has focused on areas like
human rights and the building of state bureaucracies rather than on
economic reforms or broader political reforms like democratization.
In keeping with this prior work, Wotipka and Ramirez find strong
evidence of emulation in the spread of women’s rights treaties around
the world. Though domestic factors have clearly had an impact on this
indicator of political liberalization, the popularity of women’s rights
ratifications abroad as well as national membership in international
organizations had marked effects on the likelihood that a country would
ratify the world’s most comprehensive women’s rights treaty. They inter-
pret these effects in a world polity framework in which countries moti-
vated by the desire to act ‘‘appropriately.’’ Skeptics of course may argue
that this kind of diffusion is not very consequential, because the tangible
costs of violating human rights are low, and hence the threshold for
signing them is not high.
What is perhaps most surprising in this volume, however, is the
strength of emulation-style mechanisms in several policy areas, including
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economicpolicies,thattraditionallyareanalyzedinstrictlyrationalistand
materialist terms. Three studies in the economic policy arena provide
powerful evidence the impact of diffusion by emulation in the global
spread of market-oriented policies.
Kogut and Macpherson highlight the role of epistemic communities of
experts dispersed around the world but bound together by a common
world view regarding policy in their area of expertise. They argue that it
was the global dispersion of American-trained economists – initially from
the University of Chicago but then from all leading economics depart-
ment as the Chicago School became more dominant in the profession –
that resulted in the spread of privatization to all corners of the globe. The
more American-trained economics Ph.Ds. in a country, the more likely it
was that their countries enacted privatization programs. Kogut and
Macpherson are careful to show that this effect was exogenous, that is,
thatitwasnotsimplythecasethatcountriesthatwantedtoprivatizehired
pro-privatization American economists. They also make a strong case
that local conditions and conflicts also shaped the embrace of privatiza-
tion – mediating the process of construction occurs with each and every
adoption.
Lee and Strang also focused on the global epistemic community of
economistsin their study of public sectordownsizing. They demonstrate,
however, that the power of the epistemic community supporting down-
sizing worked principally through how governments interpreted develop-
ments in other countries. Governments were more likely to reduce their
own public sector employment not only when countries they viewed as
peers downsized, but also when it seemed that such policies worked in
terms of improving macroeconomic performance. In marked contrast,
however, governments tended to ignore evidence that increasing public
sectors were good for the economy. The epistemic community in favor of
downsizing served to frame how governments viewed developments in
other countries – it was not a process of rational and objective learning.
Quinn and Toyoda also argue for the impact of epistemic communities
with respect to the spread of capital account liberalization. But the
community they identify is very different from the pro-market elite of
the economics profession in the privatization and downsizing cases. They
argue that global anti-capitalist sentiments expressed by political elites,
and reflected in global support for Communist parties, has had a strong
negative effect on capital account openness. As the epistemic community
of economists promoted capital account openness, the community of
anti-capitalist political elites successfully countered that trend. The
stronger this anti-capitalist sentiment in other countries, the less likely a
given nation was to open its capital account.
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Perhaps the most important feature of this argument is that, contra the
broad sweep of ‘‘world polity’’ arguments about the propagation of
Western/liberal policies around the world, Quinn and Toyoda demon-
strate the impact of contrary anti-capitalist and anti-Western sentiments
on developing countries in particular. They thereby counter the prevail-
ing imagery of a world in which new ideas flow seamlessly from core to
periphery.
All in all, international organizations and policy elites appear to have
strongeffects onpolicyliberalization, botheconomicandpolitical.Itmay
be that policy elites prepare the ground for learning in the economic
arena, causing national leaders to recognize evidence consistent with
theory and to neglect evidence that is inconsistent. It also seems that
the same processes of the articulation of appropriate policies by central
figuresandpromotionbyinternational organizationsthatpromotes polit-
ical liberalization also promotes economic liberalization. In the case of
political reform, the experts are human rights advocates and lawyers and
the international organizations that orbit around the United Nations. In
the case of market reform the experts are economists who gravitate to the
international financial institutions.
The future of liberalism
If we had been writing this book a decade ago, we would probably have
concluded that the processes driving more markets and more democracy
around the world would continue into the indefinite future. Today there
is good reason to be more circumspect. We strongly believe, however,
thatthissaysmoreaboutpoliticalandeconomicliberalismas anoutcome
than it does about diffusion as a process. We are agnostic on the future of
liberalization. But we are convinced that the processes of international
diffusion we have chronicled in this volume will be of increasing impor-
tance to economic, political, and social change around the world –
regardless of whether these lead to the further propagation of liberalism,
a backlash against it, or unrelated waves of global change.
When the history is written, the mid 1990s might come to appear the
high point of the spread of economic and political liberalism around the
world. The post-Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe
were in the midst of pro-market economic revolutions with strong public
support in their fledgling democracies. China was joined by India on the
path to radical economic reform, making markets an increasing reality for
two-fifths of the world’s population. Latin American leaders finally deci-
ded to take their Washington Consensus medicine, sometimes with con-
siderable enthusiasm. The World Trade Organization (WTO) was
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created to entrench and preside over a global economy founded on
strongly liberal principles.
Indeed, the Washington Consensus was all the rage not only in devel-
oping countries but in the developed world as well. Europe moved toward
the creation of the euro on the backs of fiscal discipline and tight monetary
policy, coupled with privatization and deregulation within member states.
Australia and New Zealand took the baton from Thatcher in the market-
izing vanguard, under nominally leftist governments. The Clinton admin-
istration’s core economic goals were to balance the budget and ‘‘to end
welfare as we know it.’’ The focus on the market economy was so powerful
thatitreplacedinternationalsecurityatthetopoftheforeignpolicyagenda,
as president Clinton’s administration bailed out Mexico and Russia to
defend their efforts simultaneously to create democracy and markets.
But cracks soon appeared to slow down the marketization and democ-
ratization juggernauts. Large-scale and rolling protests against the global
economy occurred with increasing intensity wherever and whenever
leaders gathered at major G8, IMF, World Bank, and WTO meetings
from Paris to Seattle to Genoa. Citizens in former Communist countries
and in Latin America grew disenchanted by the mismatch between what
they had been promised democracy and markets would bring and what
seemed to be a far less appealing reality of gaping chasms between global-
ization’s winners and losers. Europe’s leading continental economies
remained happy to talk the talk of more markets, but their governments
were unwilling to walk the walk amid widespread popular resistance and
resentment.
Just six weeks after the bloody and violent Genoa protests against the
G8, Islamic jihadis crashed two planes into the twin towers of the World
Trade Center in New York, expanding the backlash against markets and
democracy into a backlash against modernity writ large. The five years
sinceSeptember11havewitnessedapitchedbattlebetweentheWestand
the rest, not only in the war on terrorism but also in economics and
politics. Populist politicians promising to protect their citizens against
the vagaries of the market have flourished in Eastern and Central Europe
and in Latin America. Citizen support for democracy in these countries
has waned dramatically. Deep regional divides between those who have
benefited from globalization and those who have not pervade countries as
different as China, India, Mexico, and the United States. The ironically
named Doha ‘‘development round’’ of WTO talks has stalled because of
insuperable divisions over agriculture. Western governments steadfastly
committed to protecting their tiny farming sectors are charged with the
height of hypocrisy by developing countries with massive populations
supported by subsistence agriculture.
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Sober analysis with the benefit of hindsight will show that this slow-
down in the march of liberalism was probably inevitable. The spread of
markets and democracy exhibited a strong S-curve dynamic. At some
point in the late 1990s or early 2000s, the process was bound to slow
down simply because most countries had liberalized most facets of their
economies and polities. In addition to this numerical logic, the spread of
markets exacerbated the divide between haves and have nots both within
and among countries, causing citizens to question the merits of the
democratic institutions associated with turning this gap into a gulf.
Moreover, it was likely that increasing interconnections among coun-
tries would generate the need for increasing public sector interventions in
economic affairs. Issues as diverse as environmental degradation and the
piracy of intellectual property are global in scope and cannot simply be
addressed by more markets without the careful construction of inter-
national agreements among governments to regulate them.
But while all these considerations suggest that a slowdown in market-
ization and democratization was to be expected, they do not necessarily
suggest that a complete reversal of direction is imminent. The question is
a live one of whether the slowdown in the penetration of economic and
political liberalism into all facets of life in all countries will ultimately be
followed by an illberal epoch.
Economic historians are quick to point out that the last great era of
international economic openness collapsed into a spiral of depression,
protectionism, and fascism in the first half of the twentieth century, with
the implication that it could easily happen again because the same trou-
bling preconditions are evident today. The counter view is that the con-
temporaryforces ofglobalization –above alltechnologiesthatshrinktime
and space –areagenie thatcannot beput back in the bottle. On thisview,
theworldofthemarketisheretostay,andforsomethisisagoodthingfor
democracy as well. The first half of the last century can even be seen
through rose-colored glasses as an unfortunate blip – albeit a long and
devastating one – on Fukuyama’s path to the end of history.
We choose to remain agnostic on the question of whether the course of
the twenty-first century will repeat the last hundred years. But this is
orthogonal to the principle focus of this volume: on the process of inter-
national diffusion itself. We have analyzed the spread of markets and
democracy because of their global preeminence in the last decades of
the twentieth century. The question for us is whether the diffusion
processes we have analyzed in this book will continue to be of great
consequence for economic, political, and social change, irrespective of
the directions and manifestations of that change. Our answer to this
question is an unequivocal ‘‘yes.’’
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The future of international diffusion
Atitscore,theprocessofglobalizationconcernsthemorewidespreadand
more rapid movement across national boundaries not of only capital,
goods, and services but also of ideas, information, and people. In recent
decades, the tendency has been to associate this free movement with
liberalization. But it is clear that free movement can fuel anti-liberalism
as well. The increasingly global phenomena of protests against the inter-
national economic institutions as well as international terrorism have
been made possible by cell phones, the Internet, and the freer movement
of people – the other face of the globalization the protesters and terrorists
have been mobilized against.
Irrespective ofwhether oneconsiders the trendtoward everfreer global
movement an unalloyed good or not, it is increasingly clear that it is very
difficult, if not impossible, for governments to reverse it – and in partic-
ular to counteract through policy the technological innovations that have
shrunk time and space. Government regulations on different types of
capital flows tend only to stimulate more creativity in the markets regard-
ing how to use derivatives and other innovative transactions to circum-
vent them. Efforts by China to close off access to the Internet, much like
American efforts to curb offshore gambling and pornography, tend to be
more symbolic than effective. Smuggling of people and products lessen
the effects of formal barriers to migration and trade.
The result is a smaller and more connected world in which the two
diffusion mechanisms that this volume has shown to be most prominent
in the recent past – economic competition and social emulation – will
likely become more powerful, not less. The greater the opportunities
executives have to shop around the globe for investment and production
venues, the more national governments will have to pay attention to what
others are doing in the competition for business. The denser person-to-
person networks of communication become, not only face-to-face but
using the dizzying array of new communications technologies, the more
likely it is that policy ideas – liberal, illiberal, or having nothing to do with
liberalism – will flow across political boundaries.
Notwithstanding post-9/11 US foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iran,
we do not expect coercion to become a more prominent mechanism for
diffusion because it seems out of step with our world, characterized by a
mosaic of decentralized networks beyond the control of public officials.
In contrast, hegemonic ideas may continue to flow via experts and advo-
cates around the world. But ideas are theorized, touted, and legitimated;
they are not well enforced at gun-point. They seem not even to be
enforceable at loan-point by the IMF. Indeed, coercive efforts tend to
358 Geoffrey Garrett, Frank Dobbin, and Beth Simmons//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/GDM/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521878890C09.3D 359 [344–360] 8.9.2007 6:56AM
spawn effective resistance, much as we have seen since the mid 1990s
with respect to the rise of both anti-globalization and Islamic extremism.
There is also little reason to believe that well-informed learning will
become more widespread. The studies in this volume have shown that it
was very difficult for governments clearly to discern cause and effect from
liberal policy experiments in other countries in the last decades of the
twentieth century. The task will only become more complicated in the
future as the world in which policies operate becomes ever more complex
and multidimensional. This raises the danger that undesirable trends will
spread in the future by processes of more or less ‘‘unreasoned’’ mimicry
without a real performance check, either in response to what economic
competitors are doing or because of the practices among self-identified
peer nations.
Even if the world deviates from its liberal trajectory and into trends
such as nationalism, expropriation, protection, and authoritarianism,
diffusion would likely play a pivotal role. Coercion might be more promi-
nent in any such wave than was the case for liberalism because overt uses
offorcehavehistoricallybeenmorecommoninestablishingauthoritarian
regimes than democratic ones. Protection provides short-term ‘‘compet-
itive’’ advantages for some producers. Governments might learn that
certain forms of expropriation are tolerated by investors, and retreat
from their increasingly liberal treatment of Foreign direct investment.
Certainly, illiberal policies can and may diffuse in the future, as they
have in the past. Many people believe that the nature of humanity’s
interconnectedness is inherently biased in favor of liberalism. While we
hope from a normative standpoint that this is the case at least for political
liberalism,fromthepositiveperspectiveassocial scientistswecannotrule
outthepossibilityofresurgentilliberalism.Eitherway,webelievethatthe
diffusion mechanisms we have identified in this volume will play critical
roles in the future of global policy and political change.
Conclusion
Let us conclude by underlining two lessons learned from this volume
regarding core issues in the contemporary social sciences. First, a theo-
retical duality that sets up an exclusive juxtaposition of material and
ideational explanations is largely passe ´. Almost all of the studies in this
volume have emphasized that material incentives can and do coexist
with less rational, more subjective influences on decision-making.
Governments may decide to sign a women’s rights treaty because of the
social pressures emanating from UN conferences and to access develop-
mentassistance;theymayprivatizetorealizecompetitiveadvantagesover
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their trade partners and because Chicago-trained economists influence
policymaking; they may liberalize the capital account because ‘‘it works’’
and to curry favor with investors by accelerating the pace of liberalization.
Governments clearly respond to multiple stimuli and for different rea-
sions, both material and otherwise.
Second,nationalgovernmentsdonotoperateinsplendidisolationfrom
eachother.Itismucheasiertodosocialscienceresearchassuminggovern-
ments are independent actors reacting to exogenous ‘‘constraints’’ inside
and outside their borders. But this volume has shown that this independ-
ence assumption is violated over and over again, and that only by building
models of interdependent decision making among governments can we
understand some of the most important phenomena of our time.
Domesticexplanationsareonlya part–and insomecases,a smallpart–
of the explanation for the spread of liberal policies this past half century.
Closed-polity models that focus exclusively on domestic institutions,
coalitions, and interests are therefore missing much of the action, even
if they consider these variables as filters on an external environment
characterized by common exogenous shocks. Statistically, proceeding
on the basis of domestic politics alone or ‘‘common stimulus, mediated
response’’modelsrisksintroducingmassiveomittedvariablebiasintoour
understandings of policy. The risk is that by making the apparently
innocuous simplifying assumption of countries as independent actors,
we will greatly misunderstand how the world really works. By examining
the diffusion mechanisms that have facilitated the spread of liberalization
in the twentieth century, these chapters have contributed to a more
comprehensive understanding not only of the policies that have contrib-
uted to our more thoroughly globalized world but also to the underlying
interdependence of the international system.
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